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Abstract 
The problem of allocating a single indivisible object to one of several selfish agents is 
considered, where monetary payments are not allowed, and the object is not necessarily 
desirable to each agent. It is shown that ordinality and positive responsiveness together 
are necessary and sufficient conditions for strategyproofness, which implies that efficient 
social choice functions are not strategyproof. However, any Pareto-optimal, ordinal so­
cial choice function is strategyproof. A Gibbard-Satterthwaite-type impossibility result 
is established for nonbossy mechanisms. Thus, the best the planner can do without mon­
etary transfers is to give the object to an agent who desires it, but whose valuation of 
the object may not be the highest among the agents, using a mechanism that is either 
dictatorial or bossy. It is also shown that all strategyproof, nonbossy, and Pareto-optimal 
social choice functions are serial dictatorships. 
Strategyproof Allocation of a Single Object 
Szilvia Papai* 
1 Introduction 
We examine the problem of allocating a single indivisible object to one of several selfish 
agents who may or may not desire the object, using a strategyproof mechanism. The 
objective is to give away the object without receiving any monetary payments, according 
to criteria such as efficiency, using a "nice" (e.g. non.dictatorial) mechanism. 
In the context of trading, Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) have studied the problem 
of selling an indivisible object when there is a single buyer, and Makowski and Mezzetti 
(1993) examined the same problem with many buyers, both in the Bayesian framework. 
The problem of allocating a single object without any monetary transfers was consid­
ered by Glazer and Ma (1989) in the complete information framework. They constructed 
multistage mechanisms with unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes. These out­
comes are efficient in the sense that the agent with the highest valuation gets the object, 
without any monetary transfers being made at equilibrium. In this study, we assume 
that the planner cannot employ monetary transfers in order to aid the allocation pro­
cess, even if payments were only to be made out of equilibrium. Kim and Ledyard (1994) 
examined the allocation of a single object in the Bayesian framework, and found that 
it is impossible to design an ex post efficient Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism 
for allocating the object, where the agents only know the distribution of other agents' 
valuations of the object. They also considered the case of balanced transfers. If only 
Pareto-optimality is required where the welfare function depends on the allocation of the 
object and on the payments r11ade between the potential recipients and the supplier of 
the object, balanced transfers would be acceptable. However, in contexts that are not 
marketlike (e.g. within a company) or where it is not politically viable to require any 
compensations (e.g. where traditionally the object is allocated without any compensa­
tions and the potential recipients cannot be coerced to pay), no transfers of any form are 
accepted. This is the case we examine in this study, so that transfers are not allowed 
even if they were to balance. The above mentioned two papers are also different in that 
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they require that the agents have some information (complete information in the case of 
Glazer and Ma (1989)) about other agents' preferences. Since in this study mechanisms 
are required to be strategyproof, that is, the mechanism has to ensure that honest be­
havior is a dominant strategy for every agent and preference profile, it is not necessary 
for the agents to have any information about the others' preferences. Of course, it is 
assumed that the agents know their own valuation of the object, and both the agents 
and the planner know the set of admissible preferences. 
In our model the outcomes are n-dimensional if there are n agents, each dimension 
representing the alloted bundle of private goods for some agent. The agents are assumed 
to be selfish, which means: that each agent i only cares about the ith component of 
the outcome, so that preferences other than indifference are ruled out between any two 
outcomes for any agent when the agent's component of the two outcomes are the same. 
When there is only a single indivisible private good to allocate, further domain restrictions 
are not necessary, since the agents may evaluate the object in any way. To keep the 
proofs simple, we also assume that the agents cannot be indifferent between obtaining 
and not obtaining the object. That is, since an agent's utility does not change if she 
does not obtain the object, we assume that the the agents have a non-zero value for the 
object. This, however, is not necessary. The results easily generalize to the domain where 
indifferences are allowed, if we modify some of the definitions appropriately. 
In this paper we attempt to analyze the tradeoffs between strategyproofness and effi­
ciency, and examine the implications of strategyproofness when it is combined with (some 
form of) efficiency. We also investigate the possibility of avoiding dictatorship without 
losing strategyproofness, which has been a much explored subject in various contexts 
since the famous impossibility result of Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) . Strat­
egyproofness has been extensively studied in environments where outcomes are public in 
nature (for surveys of this literature see .lviuller and Satterthwaite (1986) and Sprumont 
(1995) ) .  However, given the selfishness assumption, these rules do not apply to our model. 
In particular, it should be noted that the outcome space in our model is not a product 
domain as defined in Le Breton and Sen (1995) , since the components of the outcomes 
depend on each other given the feasibility constraints. The studies that examine private 
goods allocation problems tend to focus on divisible goods so that a structure natural to 
preferences over private goods (e.g . .  continuity, nonsatiation, convexity, etc.) is imposed 
on the preferences (see, for example. Dasgupta et al. (1978) , Zhou (1991) , and Barbera 
and Jackson (1995) ). The most closely related results to ours can be found in Dasgupta 
et al. (1978) , Ritz (1983) . and Sattertln\'aite and Sonnenschein (1981). These will be 
discussed in the course of the exposition. Finally, let us note that the concept of non­
bossiness, which turns out to be �entral to our analysis, was introduced by Satterthwaite 
and Sonnenschein (1981) , and was used consequently by Ritz (1983) , Olson (1991) , and 
Barbera and Jackson (1995) among others. 
Although the results in this paper are of interest on their own, the elementary and 
intuitive proofs also offer some insight into more general aspects of the problem of al­
locating indivisible private goods b)· using strategyproof mechanisms. Throughout the 
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paper, special care is taken to emphasize which results are specific to the single object 
allocation problem due to its simple structure, which is helpful in identifying others that 
are potential candidates for generalization. 
The paper is organized as follows. The notation and basic definitions are introduced 
in Section 2. In Section 3, necessary and sufficient conditions for a social choice function 
to be strategyproof are derived, which are specific to the single object allocation problem. 
Efficiency and Pareto-optimality are analyzed in Section 4, and the relationship between 
strategyproofness and Pareto-optimality of a social choice function is established. In 
Section 5, we investigate the implications of strategyproofness on the desirability of the 
mechanism. In particular, it is shown that a Gibbard-Satterthwaite-type impossibility 
is escaped in the model we examine. However, if nonbossiness is also ruled out, which 
typically arises in the context of private goods allocation problems, then the analog of the 
Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem holds. The special case where there are only two agents 
is also considered in this section. In Section 6, we characterize the set of strategyproof, 
nonbossy, and Pareto-optimal social choice functions. 
2 Definitions and Notation 
There are n 2: 2 agents and one object to be allocated among the agents. Let N denote 
the set of n agents. An outcome x = (x1, .. . , xn) is such that xi E {O, 1 }, where 
xi = 
{ 1 if the object is given to agent i
0 otherwise, 
Vi E N. Clearly, an outcome x is feasible if at most one agent gets the object, i.e. , 
if LiEN x
i � 1. Note that the object is not necessarily awarded. The set of feasible
outcomes is denoted by X. 
Let Bi denote the value that agent i places on the object. We assume that gi E � \
{O}, Vi E N, that is, ·the agents cannot be indifferent between obtaining and not obtaining 
the object. Let 8i be the set of admissible values for each agent i, i.e. , Gi = � \ {O}.
The set of values for all agents is 8 = xiEN8i. Let B E  8 be a profile of the agents, and 
B-i E 9-i be a profile of all the agents except for agent i. 
Each agent i is assumed to be se�fish, that is, agent i only cares about the ith compo­
nent of x. Thus, the value of outcome .r to agent i with value Bi is xiBi. For notational con­
venience, we define a utility function for each agent i. by U(xi , Bi) = xiBi , Vx E X, Vi E N. 
The criteria regarding the desired rules of the outcome are embodied in social choice 
functions, functions that assign exactly one outcome to any preference profile of the 
agents. vVhen strategyproofness is required, attention is restricted to direct mechanisms, 
mechanisms that ask the agents to report their own preferences, due to the well-known 
revelation principle. Therefore, a direct mechanism that implements a social choice 
function \Vill mirror the social choice function, in the sense that the outcome of the 
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mechanism will coincide with the outcome prescribed by the social choice function for 
each preference profile. Thus, the criteria applied to the mechanisms apply to the social 
choice functions as well. 
Definition 1 A social choice function (SCF) is a function f: 8 i-+ X. 
Let Ji(B) denote the assignment prescribed to agent i by f at B. 
Definition 2 An SCF f is strategyproof if VB E 8, Vi E N, VOi E 8i, U(ji(B) , Bi) � 
U(t(ei, B-i) , Bi). If 3i E N such that U(Ji(B), Bi) < U(Ji(Oi, B-i) , Bi) for some B E 
8, Bi E Gi, then we say that f is manipulable and agent i can manipulate it. 
3 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Strategy­
proofness 
First we define two characterisitics of an SCF f, ordinality and positive responsiveness, 
which together are necessary and sufficient conditions for f to be strategyproof in our 
context. 
Definition 3 An SCF f is ordinal if VB E e, Vi E N, vei E ei such that Bi' Bi > 0 or 
Bi, ei < o, Ji(B) = Ji(ei, B-i). 
Definition 4 An SCF f satisfies positive responsiveness (PR) if VB E 8, Vi E N, VBi E 
ei (a) Bi> o, ei < o and Ji(B) = o imply that Ji(Bi, B-i) = o, and (b) Bi< o, ei > o and 
Ji( B) = 1 imply that Ji( ei, B-i) = 1. 
Proposition 1 An SCF is strategyproof if, and only if, it is ordinal and PR. 
Proof: 
Strategyproofness =? ordinalit�· 
Let f be strategyproof and not ordinal. Then 3B E 8, i E N, and Bi E Gi such that 
we have either Bi, Bi > 0 or Bi, Bi <()and r(B)-::/ ]i(Bi, B-i). Since fi(1J) E {O, 1}, Vi E 
N, VO E 8, we can assume. without loss of generality, that fi(B) = 1 and p(iJi, B-i) = 0.
Given that f is strategyprooL B1 > 0. otherwise agent i would report Bi and get O which 
she would prefer to 1 if Bi < 0. Similarly. j's strategyproofness implies that Bi < 0. We 
have reached a contradiction. 
Strategyproofness =? PR 
Let f be strategyproof and not PR. Then :::JB E e, i E N and Bi E ei such that Bi > 
0, {Ji < 0, Ji(B) = 0, and Ji({Ji, e-i) = 1. Since f is strategyproof, we must have U(O, Bi) � 
U(l. Bi), which implies that Bi < 0, a contradiction. 
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Ordinality and PR :=;.. strategyproofness 
Let f be ordinal, PR, and manipulable. Then 3B E 8, i E N, and §i E 8i such that 
U(ji(B), Bi) < U(t(Bi, B-i), Bi). Then either (a) Ji(B) = 0, ji(Bi, B-i) = 1, and Bi > 0, or 
(b) Ji(B) = 1, Ji(Bi, B-i) = o, and Bi < 0. However, PR implies that §i > o for (a) and 
Bi < 0 for (b). Therefore, f is not ordinal in either case, which is a contradiction.D 
We would like to remark here that ordinality and PR together are equivalent to the 
well-known IPM condition for strategyproofness (see, for example, Laffont and l\!Iaskin 
( 1982)) .  The proof of this is straightforward and is left to the reader. vVe will work with 
the ordinality and PR properties, since they better facilitate the following analysis, which 
will be clear throughout this paper. For now, let us say that, for the allocation of a single 
object, the condition for strategyproofness has been split into an independence property 
( ordinality) and a monotonicity property (PR). This is useful, because the independence 
property, ordinality, is very intuitive and is easily checked, and therefore it helps in ruling 
out manipulable SCF's. Although in the voting context, where the outcomes are of a 
political nature, cardinal valuations may not make sense, for resource allocation problems 
they are of importance. It is usually implicitly assumed in the implementation literature 
that only ordinal preferences can be elicited when monetary payments are not used.1 
For private goods allocation problems, this informational constraint has considerable 
consequences. While a somewhat trivial condition, ordinality has important implications 
for the efficiency of strategyproof mechanisms. This will be discussed in the next section. 
4 Efficiency 
Given the necessity of ordinality for strategyproofness, it follows immediately that it is 
not possible to design an efficient strategyproof mechanism, a mechanism 'Nhich assigns 
the object to the agent who values it most. The same is shown in the Bayesian frame­
work by Kim and Ledyard ( 1994, Theorem 1). However, ordinality implies more than 
that. It rules out any interpersonal utility level comparisons, and therefore, less stringent 
efficiency criteria, such as assigning the object to an agent whose value for it is within 
the k(k ::; n) highest positive values, or even assigning it to an agent whose value is 
not the lowest among the positive valuations, cannot be implemented. Therefore, we 
resort to Pareto-optimality as a criterion of efficiency, given that Pareto-optimal SCF's 
may satisfy ordinality. vVe use the stronger notion of Pareto-optimality, which is more 
appropriate in this context than the other. weaker version. In fact, the weak version of 
Pareto-optimality, which only requires that no other feasible outcome should be strictly 
preferred to the prescribed outcome by all agents at any profile, is automatically satisfied, 
as long as there are at least three agents. However, the strong Pareto-optimality condition 
is still very weak, in the sense that it typically allows for several different outcomes. 
Definition 5 An SCF f is Pareto-optimal if 'r:/8 E 8, there does not exist y E X such 
that U(yi,81) 2: U(ji(B),Bi).'r:/i E JV, and for some j E N, U(yJ, BJ) > U(ji(B) , BJ). 
1 An explicit discussion of this issue with regard to Nash-implementation can be found, for example, 
in .tvlaskin ( 1986). 
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If an SCF j is Pareto-optimal then Vi E N, VB E 8, Ji(B) = 1 implies that Bi > 0. 
Therefore, a Pareto-optimal SCF also satisfies individual rationality, where f is individu­
ally rational if Vi E N, VB E 8, B < 0 implies that Ji( B) = 0. Individual rationality alone, 
however, is satisfied by an imposed mechanism, for example, in which the object is never 
awarded. Pareto-optimality, on the other hand, implies citizen sovereignty. 
Definition 6 An SCF j satisfies citizen sovereignty (CS) if Vx E X, :3B E 8 such that 
J(B) = x. 
Now we show that any Pareto-optimal and ordinal SCF is strategyproof. 
Proposition 2 If an SCF is ordinal and Pareto-optimal then it is strategyproof. 
Proof: Notice that if an SCF violates PR then ::Ji E N and B E 8 such that Bi < 0 
and Ji( B) = 1. This, however, implies that f is not Pareto-optimal. Therefore, Pareto­
optimality implies PR, which, together with Proposition 1, yields the required result.D 
From the above proof it is also clear that if PR is violated, then individual rationality 
does not hold either. Thus, any individually rational ordinal SCF is strategyproof. 
We would like to point out that the above result only holds in the context of the 
single object allocation problem, and it does not generalize to more complex problems, 
for example, where there is more than one object to allocate. This is illustrated in 
Example 1. Given the proof of Proposition 2, this should not come as a surprise. The 
proof is based on a relationship between Pareto-optimality and PR, namely, that any 
Pareto-optimal SCF also satisfies PR. Since Pareto-optimality is an intraprofile property 
(i.e., it can be determined whether the outcome is Pareto-optimal for a given profile), 
while PR is an interprofile property, this relationship is clearly due to the simple structure 
of our problem, and cannot hold in general. Before the example is provided, we need 
an appropriate generalization of the ordinality property for the case ·where there is more 
than one object to allocate. Note that in this case each :r E X is a matrix, and each 
Bi E 8i is a vector. 
Definition 7 An SCF f is ordinal if VB E 8, Vi E N. V{Ji E 8i such that V:r, y E 
X,U(xi,Bi) > U(yi,Bi) {:;. U(:riJn > U(y1JJ1) . .f1(B) = .t(ei , e- i ) . 
Example 1 An ordinal, Pareto-optimal. and manipulable SCF for allocating more than 
one object. 
Let there be two agents and two objects to be allocated among them. Then the two 
agents have strict preferences over the elements of the set {a, b, ab, 0}, where a and b are 
the two objects. ab indicates the allocation to an agent when the agent gets both objects, 
and 0 denotes the allocation to an agent when she doesn't get anything. Consider the 
following SCF. If both agents prefer a to b or if both prefer b to a, give agent 1 her first 
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choice, and then give agent 2 her first choice from the remaining object(s). Otherwise, 
if the two agents' preference orderings are not the same over a and b, then give agent 2 
her first choice, and then agent 1 her first choice from the remaining object(s). This SCF 
is Pareto-optimal and ordinal. However, it is not strategyproof. Consider the reported 
preferences (ab,b,a,O) for agent 1, and (ab,a,b,O) for agent 2. Since 1 prefers b to a and 
2 prefers a to b, agent 2 gets her first choice, ab, and agent 1 gets 0. However, agent 1 
can manipulate the outcome by reporting (ab, a, b, 0) and obtaining ab, her first choice, 
instead of 0, her last choice.D 
Our next question is, which strategyproof mechanisms satisfy Pareto-optimality? In 
order to answer this question, we need the concept of bossiness, which was introduced by 
Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein ( 1981) . An SCF is bossy if there exists at least one agent 
whose preferences can change in a way that the prescribed allocation is different to some 
other agent(s), but not to herself, while everyone else's preferences are unchanged. Intu­
itively, this is an undesirable property, given that the mechanism mirrors the SCF that 
it implements. This means that the agent who can change some other agent's allocation 
without changing her own may use her "power" by accepting a bribe or blackmailing. 
Note that bossiness is only a concern when indifference between outcomes is allowed. In 
particular, when private goods are being allocated and the agents are selfish, indifferences 
cannot be ruled out, so that a mechanism may allow agents to change the allocations for 
others without changing their own allocation. For a further discussion of bossiness see 
Ritz (1983). 2  
Definition 8 An SCF f is bossy if  ::38 E 8, i E N, and §i E E>i such that fi(B) = 
fi(§i, e-i) and ji(B) =I- fj(Bi, e-i) for some j E N. An SCF f is nonbossy if it is not 
bossy. If i E N  is such that fi (B) = fi(Bi, e-i) and :::Jj E N  such that fj(B) =I- ji(Bi, e-i) 
for some B E 8, gi E 8, then we say that agent i is bossy. 
In order to answer the earlier question, we prove Proposition 3, which says that a 
strategyproof, nonbossy, and CS SCF is Pareto-optimal. 
Proposition 3 If an SCF is strategyproof, nonbossy, and CS then it is Pareto-optimal. 
Proof: Let an SCF f be strategyproof, nonbossy, CS, and not Pareto-optimal. By 
Proposition 1, f is ordinal and PR. Since f is not Pareto-optimal, we have one of the 
following two cases: 
(a) =ie E e such that Bi > 0 for some i E I\T and f(B) = 0. 
(b) =ie E 8 such that gi < O for some i E N  and fi(B) = 1. 
Let's look at the two cases in turn. 
(a) Since f satisfies CS, :::JB E 8 such that fi(B) = 1. Consider the sequence of profiles 
2Ritz calls bossy social choice functions corruptible, and also defines corruptibility for social choice 
correspondences. 
7 
Let i = 1. Since f is nonbossy, the outcome either does not change when ()j is replaced 
b ()-j · h b .f fil Jj(()1 gj-l ()-j g-n) - 1 f · - 2 y m t e a ove sequence o pro es, or , . .. , , , . . .  , or J , ... , n. 
Thus, j1(()1,B-1) = Ji(()i,{J-i) = 0. Since Ji(B) = l,Bi < 0, by ordinality. However, this 
violates PR. 
(b) Since f satisfies CS, :3() E 8 such that j(()) = 0. Now we can repeat the first part of 
the argument in case (a) to get that Ji(()i, {J-i) = 0. Since Ji(B) = 1, (Ji > 0, by ordinality. 
However, this violates PR.D 
We would like to note here that there is a related result in Dasgupta, Hammond and 
Maskin ( 1978, Theorem 3.3.1) for the domain where all strict orderings are admissible, 
although in a much more general framework. Their result does not require nonbossiness, 
since indifference between outcomes is ruled out. 
5 A Gibbard-Satterthwaite-type Impossibility Result 
for N onbossy Mechanisms 
The focus of this section is whether a Gibbard-Satterthwaite-type result holds for the 
private goods domain when there is a single object to allocate. That is, we would like to 
know whether the strategyproof mechanisms used to implement the chosen SCF can be 
nondictatorial. First, we demonstrate by an example that a Gibbard-Satterthwaite-type 
impossibility is escaped in our context. The example is given for the case where there 
· are at least three agents, since the two-agent case will be treated later. 
Definition 9 An SCF f is dictatorial if :Ji E N such that \;/() E 8, '\h: E X, j(()) = x 
only if Vy E X, U(xi, (Ji) :::::_ U(yi, ()1). Then i is called a dictator. with respect to f.
Example 2 A strategyproof, CS, and nondictatorial SCF for n :::::_ 3. 
Let n = 3. Let ( 1, 2, 3) be a fixed ordering of the three agents. Consider the following 
SCF f. If there is an odd number of agents whose values are positive for the object, give 
the object to the first agent in the above fixed ordering whose value is positive. If there 
is an even number of agents whose values are positive for the object, give the object 
to the second agent in the above ordering whose value is positive. If all agents have 
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negative values for the object then don't give the object to any one of them. Clearly, 
this SCF satisfies citizen sovereignty. On the basis of the following table containing all 
the different profiles based on preference orderings and the corresponding outcomes, it is 




[±] + + 
+ [±] + 
+ [±] [±] 
[±] [±] - -- [±] 
(In the table + means a positive value and - means a negative value for the object. 
The columns represent profiles and the rows represent agents. The outcome for each 
preference profile is indicated by the boxes.) 
The example generalizes to n > 3. The SCF f, as defined above, clearly satisfies 
CS for any number of agents. Since no agent with a negative value will obtain the 
object, only agents with a positive value have any reason to manipulate. However, if an 
agent reports a negative value instead of a true positive one, which is the only way for 
her to change the allocation given f, then she will not obtain the object. Thus, f is 
strategyproof for n > 3 agents. To see that f is also nondictatorial for n > 3, consider 
the preference profile ( +, . . . , +) for then agents, i.e., where each agent's value is positive 
for the object. Then, if n is odd, agent 1 gets the object according to f, and if n is even, 
then agent 2 gets the object. Thus, agents 3, . . .  , n are not dictators. Notice, however, 
that if the preference profile ( +, . . .  , +, - ) is reported then agent 2 gets the object if n is 
odd, and agent 1 gets the object if n is even. Therefore, agents 1 and 2 are not dictators 
with respect to f either. D 
Notice, first, that the SCF does not only satisfy CS in the above example, but it is 
also Pareto-optimal. Secondly, note that f is bossy. For example, 2 is bossy when agents 
1 and 3 both report+, and agent 3 is bossy when agents 1 and 2 both report+. The next 
proposition verifies that this obserrntion is true in general, that is, any Pareto-optimal, 
strategyproof, and nonbossy mechanism is dictatorial. 
Proposition 4 If an SCF is strntegyprooj, nonbossy, and Pareto-optimal then it is dic­
tatorial. 
Proof: First note that j E N is a dictator vYith respect to an SCF f if jJ ( B) = 1 whenever 
ej > 0, and if fj(B) = 0 whenever BJ < 0 fore E 8. Fix a strategyproof, nonbossy, and 
Pareto-optimal SCF f. Let e E 8 be such that Bi > 0, Vi E N. Then :Jj E N such that 
fj(B) = 1, by Pareto-optimality. Then Vi i= j the ordinality off (using Proposition 1) 
implies that v{Ji > o, Ji(Bi. g-i) = 0, and PR implies (again, using Proposition 1) that 
v{Ji < o, Ji({Ji, e-i) = o. Therefore. Vii= j, agent i cannot change the outcome for herself, 
as long as agent j's reported value is Bj. Since f is nonbossy, Jl(Bj, {J-j) = 1, v{J-j E e-j, 
including {Ji= ei, Vii= j. Then P(B) = 1, \:;/BJ > 0, v{J-j E e-j, by ordinality. However, 
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we also have fj (B) = 0, vej < 0, ve-j E e-j' since f is Pareto-optimal. Therefore, j is a
dictator with respect to f ,  and f is dictatorial. D 
Given Proposition 3, Pareto-optimality can be replaced by citizen sovereignty in 
Proposition 5, which gives an analog to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem for nonbossy 
mechanisms. 
Corollary 1 If an SCF is strategyproof, nonbossy, and CS then it is dictatorial. 
Corollary 1 shows that if no manipulations in the form of bossiness are allowed then 
the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem carries over to the situation where a single object 
is being allocated to selfish agents. Ritz (1983) proved a related result to Corollary 1. 
Theorem 3 of Ritz (1983) implies that any rational, nonbossy, strategyproof, and CS 
mechanism is dictatorial on the domain we examine. Our result does not require ra­
tionality. (See Muller and Satterthwaite (1986) on the importance of the rationality 
condition.) 
Another immediate implication of Proposition 4, combined with Proposition 2, is the 
following. 
Corollary 2 If an SCF is ordinal, nonbossy, and Pareto-optimal then it is dictatorial. 
Now we turn to the case where there are only two agents, which is somewhat different 
from the general case. First, it is shown that for this special case any Pareto-optimal 
SCF is nonbossy. 
Proposition 5 If n = 2 and an SCF is Pareto-optimal then it is nonbossy. 
Proof: For any Pareto-optimal SCF f, we have f 1 ( +, -) = 1, f2 ( -, +) = 1, and
f(-, -) = 0 for possible profiles of the agents, based onl�' on preference orderings.
Furthermore, Pareto-optimality also requires that either f1( +, +) = 1 or f2( +, +) = 1.
Now it is easy to check that f is nonbossy.D 
If f is also strategyproof in the above proof then the ordinality of f implies that if
Ji(+,+) = 1 for some profile(+,+). ,,·here i E {1 . 2}, then Ji(+, +) = 1 for any profile
( +, +). Thus. either 1 or 2 is a dictator \\'ith respect to f .  Therefore, we can obtain the
following two corollaries, both of which are also implied by earlier results. 
Corollary 3 If n = 2 and an SCP is strategyproof and Pareto-optimal then it is dicta­
torial. 
Corollary 3 follows from Propositions .J and 5. 
Corollary 4 If n = 2 and an SCP is ordinal and Pareto-optimal then it is dictatorial. 
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This corollary is implied by Corollary 3 and Proposition 2. 
It follows from Corollary 1 that if an SCF is strategyproof, nondictatorial, and CS 
then it is bossy. Then Proposition 5 implies that the SCF is not Pareto-optimal when 
n = 2. An example of such an SCF f is given by f ( +, +) = (1, 0), f (-, +) = (0, 1), and
f ( +, -) = J(-, -) = (0, 0) . Finally, it should be remarked that Corollary 4 does not
generalize to the case where there is more than one object to allocate. This is illustrated 
by the SCF in Example 1, which is ordinal, Pareto-optimal, and nondictatorial. Example 
1 is also a counterexample to the generalization of Corollary 2. 
6 Serial Dictatorship 
Unlike in the voting context, dictatorship alone does not characterize the set of strate­
gyproof, nonbossy, and Pareto-optimal SCF's. When there are only two agents, a Pareto­
optimal and dictatorial SCF is strategyproof and nonbossy. Therefore, we have a com­
plete characterization for the two-agent case. This, however, is not true for more than 
two agents. Take, for example, a Pareto-optimal and dictatorial SCF such that agent 1 is 
the dictator with respect to f, and j(O, 8, 7) = (0, 1, 0), f(O, 7, 7) = (0, 0, 1), f(-2, 7, 7) = 
(0, 1, 0). Clearly, f is not strategyproof, since agent 2 can manipulate it, and agent 1 is
bossy, so it is not nonbossy either. We show next that the set of strategyproof, nonbossy, 
and Pareto-optimal SCF's is characterized by serial dictatorships. In our context,3 a
serial dictatorship is a mechanism in which the agents have priorities for the object in a 
predetermined order. That is, in a serial dictatorship, the object is awarded to the first 
agent in a fixed ordering of the agents who reports a positive value. Satterthwaite and 
Sonnenschein (1981) established a similar characterization result in a lot more general 
frame·work. However, they require the mechanisms to satisfy numerous differentiability 
conditions, and, although they don't require Pareto-optimality, some further conditions 
in addition to strategyproofness and nonbossiness are imposed on the mechanism in order 
to get serial dictatorships. 
In the following, let a- denote a permutation of N. 
Definition 10 An SCF f is a serial dictatorship if :30- = (o-1, .. . , o-n) such that VB E
8, Vi E N, fa' (B) = 1 if, and only if. Ba' > 0, and Vj E N, such that j < i, BaJ < 0. \f\Te
then call a- the hierarchy associated with f. 
Proposition 6 An SCF is strategyproof, nonbossy, and Pareto-optimal if, and only if, 
it is a serial dictatorship. 
Proof: Suppose f is a serial dictatorship and t.he hierarchy associated with f is a- = 
(1, ... , n). Then VB E 8, Vi E �!\�, p (B) = 1 implies that Bi > 0, and VB E 8, J(B) = 0
implies that Bi < 0. Vi E JY. Thus, f is Pareto-optimal. Nmv suppose that f is bossy.
3For more on serial dictatorships. see Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein ( 1981). 
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Then 3i,j E N,f} E 8, and iJi E 8i such that ji(f}) = Ji(iJi,()-i) and Ji(()) =f. Ji(iJi,()-i). 
This implies that Ji(e) = Ji(§i,e-i) = O. Let Ji(())= 1 and fj(§i,e-i) = O, without loss 
of generality. By Pareto-optimality, f}j > 0, so if j < i then Ji(iJi,e-i) = 1. However, if
j > i then iJi < 0, so that Ji ( §i, e-i) = 1 in this case, too. This proves that f is nonbossy. 
It is straightforward to verify that f is ordinal. Therefore, given Proposition 2, it follows 
that f is strategyproof. 
Now we prove the converse. Let f be strategyproof, nonbossy, and Pareto-optimal. 
Suppose 3(), BE e, i, j E N, i =/:- j, such that Ji(()) = 1, ji(B) = 1,§i > 0, and ()i > 0. Let
(jt < 0, Vt E N, t =/:- i, j. Since f is ordinal, jl((Jt, e-t) = 0, Vt E N, t =/:- i, j such that et < 0.
Since f is PR, jl(1Jt, e-t) = 0, Vt E N, t =/:- i, j such that f}t > 0. Then, by nonbossiness, 
Ji ( ()i, ()i Jj-i,i) = 1. A similar argument shows that Ji ( §i, iJj JJ-i,j) = 1. Given that f
is Pareto-optimal, ()i > 0 and thus Ji(iJi, f}j JJ-id) = 1, by ordinality. Similarly, iJj > O 
by Pareto-optimality, and so Ji(iJi, ()i, "tJ-id) = 1, by ordinality. This is a contradiction. 
Therefore, Ve,iJ E 8, Vi, j E N, if Ji(B) = 1,iJi > 0, and f}j > 0 then Ji(e) = 0. Thus,
there exists an ordering of the agents, () = ( ()1, . . .  , (Jn) , such that Vf} E 8, Vi E N, if
f°.i (e) = 1 then Vj E N,j =/:- i, such that eui > 0, we have j > i. Then Vj E N  such that
j < i, we have eui < 0. By Pareto-optimality, if Jui (e) = 1, eui > 0. Now suppose that 
for some i E N  and(} E 8 we have eu; > 0, Vj E N  such that j < i we have eui < 0, and
Ji(e) = 0. Then Pareto-optimality implies that 3j E N  such that eui > 0 and Jui (e) = 1, 
where j > i. However, in this case eui < 0, which is a contradiction. Therefore, it follows 
that f is a serial dictatorship. D 
Given Propositions 3 and 2, we have the following corollaries. 
Corollary 5 An SCF is strategyproof, nonbossy, and CS if, and only if, it is a serial 
dictatorship. 
Corollary 6 An SCF is ordinal, nonbossy, and Pareto-optimal if, and only if, it is a 
serial dictatorship. 
Clearly, Proposition 6 does not hold for more complex allocation problems. 
A natural and convenient decentralization of a serial dictatorship is to ask the first
agent in the hierarchy associated with the mechanism whether she wants the object. If 
she turns it down then we ask the second agent, etc., until one of the agents takes the 
object, or until we have asked each agent. This decentralized mechanism greatly reduces 
the informational requirements, while retaining the properties of a serial dictatorship. 
Notice that the ordering of the agents is exogeneously given in a serial dictatorship. 
Thus, the supplier of the object (or society) may determine the order. It can be set up as 
a priority ranking, incorporating some criteria of justice or other known characteristics 
of the individuals. 
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